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A Suitable Metaphysics for
Fictional Entities
Why One Has to Run Syncretistically
Alberto Voltolini
There is a list of desiderata that any good metaphysics of fictional entities should be
able to fulfill. These desiderata are: 1) the nonexistence of fictional entities; 2) the
causal inefficacy of such entities; 3) the incompleteness of such entities; 4) the created
character of such entities; 5) the actual possession by ficta of the narrated properties;
6) the unrevisable ascription to ficta of such properties; and 7) the necessary
possession by ficta of such properties. (Im)possibilist metaphysics uncontroversially
satisfy 1) and 2); Neo-Meinongian metaphysics satisfy 1), 2), 3), 5), 6), and 7);
artefactualist or creationist metaphysics uncontroversially satisfy 1), 2), 3), and 4).
Another metaphysics is needed in order to satisfy all such desiderata. In this chapter
I develop such a metaphysics, claiming that a Syncretistic metaphysics that combines
Neo-Meinongianism with Artefactualism achieves this purpose. According to
Syncretism, ficta are hybrid entities individuated in terms of both a certain make-
believe narrative process and the set of properties that one such narration mobilizes.
Toward the end of the chapter I consider some possible criticisms to this approach:
its non-intuitiveness; ficta’s unnecessary proliferation; and troubles with creationism
of any sort.
1. How to Choose the Best Metaphysics
for Fictional Entities
What are fictional entities, provided that there are any? In the relevant literature,
there has been considerable discussion about the nature of fictional entities. Theor-
etically speaking, this is a metaphysical investigation of such entities that comes
utterly apart from the ontological investigation as to whether, in the general inventory
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of what there is, there are such things as fictional entities.1 In principle, therefore, one
can perform a metaphysical investigation of fictional entities utterly independently of
one’s ontological convictions about them. Moreover, even if one is not committed to
such entities, that is, even if one is an antirealist about them, it would be desirable to
provide a metaphysical explanation as to why the metaphysical kind being a fictional
entity is not instantiated. (An individual believes this when she says that there are no
fictional entities.) As a matter of fact, however, most of those who have seriously
engaged in a metaphysical investigation of fictional entities have also been ontologic-
ally committed to them, i.e., they have been realists about such entities.2
Nevertheless, even among those who believe there are fictional entities, there is
serious metaphysical disagreement as to what such entities are. Basically, three
different metaphysics are competing in the philosophical marketplace—the remain-
ing alternatives being minor variants of these three.3
(Im)possibilists about fictional entities believe that ficta are a subset of (im)possible
entities, i.e., entities that do not exist in the actual world, but exist in some merely
possible (or impossible) world.4
Orthodox Neo-Meinongians believe that ficta are a subset of Meinongian objects,
considered as ontological correlates of a set of properties—typically, the properties
mobilized in the relevant narration, e.g. Emma Bovary is the fictional correlate of the
set of properties being a woman, living in the French countryside, being an unhappy
bride etc. that Flaubert mobilizes in telling the story Madame Bovary.5 According to
Orthodox Neo-Meinongians, ficta neither exist spatiotemporally nor subsist, i.e.,
exist non-spatiotemporally.
Unorthodox Neo-Meinongians think that ficta, like any other Meinongian object,
subsist. For they take all such objects to be abstract entities, i.e., entities non-
spatiotemporally located and (thereby) devoid of causal powers. This metaphysical
1 In this way of putting things, I follow Thomasson (1999).
2 A remarkable exception is Everett (2005).
3 For example, the intentionalist metaphysics of fictional entities qua entities of imagination a` la Sartre
(1940) may be taken as a variant of Artefactualism, particularly Thomasson (1999); Wolterstorff ’s (1980)
metaphysics of ficta as person-types may be taken as a variant of unorthodox Meinongianism.
4 (Im)possibilists come in two varieties. Those inspired by Lewis’ modal realism take ficta as world-
bound entities inhabiting (im)possible worlds different from the actual one. For some doubts as to whether
Lewis himself (1978) has to be legitimately ranked among those people, see Sainsbury (2009: 82–7). Priest
(2005) defends a ‘fixed domain’-approach to fictional entities, according to which one and the same fictum
does not exist in the actual world, yet it exists in some other merely (im)possible world. If the properties
that are mobilized in the relevant narration are compatible, the worlds in which a fictum exists are possible;
impossible otherwise. See also Berto (2013).
5 Rapaport (1978), Parsons (1980), Routley (1980), Castan˜eda (1989) may all be ranked among
orthodox Neo-Meinongians. Parsons and Routley believe that the properties belonging to the relevant
set are special properties, nuclear properties, to be distinguished from extranuclear properties as properties
that also qualify ficta yet do not belong to one such set. Castan˜eda and Rapaport instead believe that ficta
are predicated just one and the same kind of properties, yet the properties belonging to the set are
predicated internally, while those not belonging to the set are predicated externally. Castan˜eda moreover
believes that an ordinary fictum is a conglomeratum of set-correlates—Meinongian objects or guises, as he
calls them—tied together by a special relation weaker than identity that he labels consociation.
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account makes it the case that the relationship between ficta and the properties
mobilized in the relevant narrations has nothing to do with set-membership.6 Qua
abstracta, ficta possess such properties more or less in the same way that a role, or a
Platonic attribute, is characterized by its characterizing feature.7 Furthermore, Arte-
factualists, or creationists, about fictional entities, keep the idea that ficta are abstract
entities. Yet they link ficta’s non-spatiotemporal existence with a human mental
activity. Ficta are taken to be creations of their authors, insofar as a fictional entity
comes into existence as soon as an author (or a community made both by the
author and her audience) thinks of it, typically by engaging in an ontologically
non-committal make-believe process8 that there is something doing the things told
in the relevant narration. In this sense, ficta are dependent entities, namely entities
depending for their existence on the existence of their authors (or of the relevant
communities made by authors and their audience). As such, they are relevantly
similar to institutional entities (laws, nations, treaties, etc.), which also show similar
patterns of dependence for their existence. In this respect, ficta are taken to be
abstract artefacts. In cashing out this idea, Thomasson (1999) claims that ficta are
a subset of pure intentionalia, those objects of thought that come into being insofar as
they are thought of by someone. Ficta are those pure intentionalia that are kept in
existence by the fact that some copy or other of the relevant narrations concerning
them survives as well. If no copy of the Holmes stories were to survive, the fictional
detective Sherlock Holmes would perish as well.9
Despite various similarities, the Neo-Meinongian and the artefactualist metaphys-
ics are usually taken to be incompatible. Neo-Meinongians of all kinds take ficta to be
some sort of entity localizable in a sort of mind-transcendent Platonic realm, either
qua (correlates of ) set-theoretical entities or qua roles viz. Platonic attributes.
Artefactualists, on the other hand, tend to conceive of ficta as depending on the
intentional working of human minds. Yet a few years ago I defended an approach
aimed at showing that there is no such incompatibility (see Voltolini, 2006). Let me
briefly explain why.
The main merit of Neo-Meinongianism is at the same time the main defect of
Artefactualism, and vice versa. On the one hand, by appealing to a certain property
set, the properties mobilized in the relevant narration, Neo-Meinongians yield a
precise criterion of identity for ficta: x and y are the same fictum iff they share a
6 Zalta (1983), who is the main defender of this approach, believes that the properties characterizing a
fictum are predicated of it internally—are encoded by it, as he says. Encoding is, for him, a primitive mode
of predication having nothing to do with set-membership.
7 This idea is foreshadowed in Santambrogio (1990).
8 Evans (1982) calls one such process an existentially creative make-believe game (to be distinguished
from ontologically committal make-believe processes, i.e., existentially conservative make-believe games,
that typically affect ordinary individuals).
9 Artefactualism stems out of original ideas of Ingarden (1931), Kripke (2011), and van Inwagen (1979).
Nowadays it is the most popular metaphysics among realists on ficta. Cf. e.g. Braun (2005), Goodman
(2004), Predelli (2002), Salmon (1998, 2002), Schiffer (1996, 2003), Searle (1979).
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certain property set.10 By contrast, Artefactualists claim that ficta do not properly
possess such properties; abstract artefacts are neither brilliant detectives, nor sad or
frivolous women. While the artefactualist provides existence conditions for ficta (in
terms of the mental activities leading to their creation), she fails to provide secure
identity conditions for them.11 On the other hand, the artefactualist accounts for the
human character of fictional entities by making them mind-dependent entities; the
Neo-Meinongian fails to explain this character because she is forced to conceive of
them as some sort of transcendent Platonic, and hence mind-independent, being.
Now, Syncretism, as I label my approach, aims to preserve the merits of both
doctrines without inheriting any of their respective defects. I do this by conceiving
of ficta as hybrid entities made of both a make-believe process type (the storytelling
process leading to the generation of a certain fictum) and a set of properties (the
properties mobilized in such a narrative process).12
Of course it is one thing to put forward a Syncretistic metaphysics, quite another to
motivate it well. A proper motivation cannot amount to a mere longing for shallow
compromises. Here is why one has to run Syncretistically. As I said before, Orthodox
Neo-Meinongians claim that ficta are correlates of property sets. Yet they do not
usually explain how such a correlation works.13 Syncretism claims that the relevant
process of make-believe allows us to perform such a correlation. Once one sees the
non-committal narrative process in which one makes believe that there is something
having certain properties as a process in which one makes believe that the set of such
properties is a (typically concrete) individual having those properties, then a certain
fictum arises out of that very set. That way of seeing things allows one to focus on the
aforementioned two components that for the Syncretist constitute a fictum, namely, a
certain set of properties and the relevant make-believe process in which those
properties are mobilized. More importantly, though, it allows one to see how these
components are related, so that the make-believe process operates on the property set
in question in order to correlate it with the relevant fictum. (Incidentally, unlike
Orthodox Neo-Meinongianism, the fictum-set correlation is a many-one correlation,
insofar as different make-believe processes may involve one and the same set.)14 On
the one hand, therefore, Syncretism shares with Orthodox Neo-Meinongianism the
idea that a fictum is constituted by a certain set of properties. On the other hand,
since for Syncretists a new way of seeing the relevant make-believe process is needed
in order for a fictum to come into existence, Syncretism shares with Artefactualism
10 Cf. e.g. Parsons (1980: 28). 11 As Thomasson (1999: 68) acknowledges.
12 Or at least properties corresponding to the properties mobilized in such a process (cf. Voltolini, 2006:
90 ff ).
13 Castan˜eda (1989) may be considered an exception. For one may take his individuator operator that
gets a guise out of a set of properties as a mental operation acting directly on the properties belonging to the
relevant set (cf. Orilia [2002: 148]). If properly evaluated, this proposal can be suitably developed in the
terms of the present proposal. See immediately below in the text.
14 See again Voltolini (2006: 105).
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the idea that ficta are generated entities, depending for their existence on the
existence of certain mental processes or states.15
Now, since so many different metaphysics for fictional entities are available in the
philosophical marketplace, how can we choose between them? Of course, it is natural
to argue in favour of one’s own metaphysical perspective and against all the others.
Yet there is another possibility involving what Castan˜eda (1980) takes to be a
diaphilosophical method. According to this method, one has to collect as much
data as possible concerning the topic of interest, in this case fictional entities. The
best theory of those entities will thus be the one that accommodates most of the data.
In what follows, I will therefore set out a bunch of data, and, on that basis, compare
all the metaphysics of ficta I have hitherto outlined. I will show that, unlike its
competitors, Syncretism manages to account for all such data.
Before proceeding, a caveat. One may criticize the idea that philosophical theories
of any kind rely on something like indisputable data. A theorist may well claim that,
in providing her own theory, her explanatory task requires her to stick to some data
while rejecting others. On the basis of this, one may deny that the best theory on a
given subject matter is the one that accommodates all the purported data, for some
purported data aren’t genuine data at all. Nonetheless, in the present case all the
intuitions I will call upon are on the same footing: none of them is so indisputable
that one has to stick to it and drop the rest (or, to put it the other way around, any
such intuition receives the same amount of commonsensical consensus). Thus,
instead of putting forward a metaphysics that saves some such intuitions and lets
the others fall apart, as has hitherto been done, I claim that a theory that accounts for
all such intuitions is preferable to other theories on the same subject matter. In this
respect, let me call such intuitions desiderata rather than data, in the sense that for
each of them it is prima facie better to preserve the intuition rather than reject it.
2. A List of Desiderata and How the Syncretistic
Metaphysics Best Accounts for Them
Let me now outline the intuitive desiderata that any metaphysical theory of fictional
entities should preserve rather than dismiss. Here they are: 1) the nonexistence of
fictional entities; 2) the causal inefficacy of such entities; 3) the incompleteness of
such entities; 4) the created character of such entities; 5) the actual possession by ficta
of the narrated properties; 6) the unrevisable ascription to ficta of such properties;
and 7) the necessary possession by ficta of such properties. Let me consider each of
them in turn.
According to 1), fictional entities do not exist. Antirealists about fictional entities
take 1) as simply having the ontological reading that (in the general inventory of what
15 Cf. Voltolini (2006: Chapter 3).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 11/11/2014, SPi
A SUITABLE METAPHYSICS FOR FICTIONAL ENTITIES 133
Comp. by: Vasanthi Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0002236233 Date:11/11/14 Time:12:38:15
Filepath://ppdys1122/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process/0002236233.3d134
there is), there are no such things as fictional entities. Yet this seems not to be the
intended reading of 1). For one thing, such a reading does not enable us to draw a
distinction between genuine fictional characters and only purported ones. Take for
instance Mickey Mouse, who certainly does not exist. Yet there is a character so
named, while there is no fictional character named ‘Pickey Pouse’. So, Mickey
Mouse’s nonexistence cannot be accounted for by saying that there is no such
thing as Mickey. Rather, one is clearly tempted to say that—unlike Pickey—there is
such a thing as Mickey, yet it has the special feature that it does not exist. To explain
what such a feature really consists in is the job of a metaphysician; the fact that there
are nonexistent fictional characters has to be understood in metaphysical terms.
As to 2), in order for an entity to be endowed with causal powers, it must not only
be able to produce effects, but also to be causally affected.16 Now, although the issue is
controversial, fictional entities may be said to produce some sorts of effects, e.g. on
human behaviour. People claim to be moved by the fate of fictional entities—if the
anecdote is correct, some people have even committed suicide after having been
moved by the sorrows of Goethe’s young Werther. Yet nothing can causally modify a
fictional character. No spectator can prevent Puccini’s heroine Tosca from jumping
out of Castel Sant’Angelo and dying. If (in Stephen King’s famous novel Misery) the
psychotic Annie Wilkes doesn’t want the fictional character Misery to die, she has to
prevent the writer Paul Sheldon from publishing a story to the effect that Misery dies.
For once the writer has published such a story, there is nothing Annie can do to
prevent such a death. In sum, fictional characters are causally inefficacious.
As to 3), there are many features that ficta appear neither to possess nor to fail to
possess, precisely when the relevant tale is silent on the matter. Sherlock Holmes
appears neither to have a mole on his left shoulder nor to fail to have one. For in
telling his story, Conan Doyle has neither said nor implied anything about such a
mole.
As to 4), we clearly speak of ficta as the creations of an author, in the sense that
ficta depend for their existence on the existence of their authors or on some mental
activity on their authors’ part. Carlo Collodi is Pinocchio’s creator. Had Collodi not
conceived of him by writing a tale that concerns him, Pinocchio would not have
existed.
As to 5), we want the features we ascribe to ficta in the stories about them to be
actually possessed by them. Anna Karenina is a woman, Sherlock Holmes is a
detective. Perhaps Anna is not a woman in the same way as Penelope Cruz is, but
she is nonetheless a woman. It would be hard to explain why we are moved by her sad
fate, if her fate did not actually affect her. This actual possession of properties enables
us to perform both interfictional and crossfictional comparisons, as when we say that
16 As forcefully stressed by Frege, who precisely argued for the causal inefficacy of Gedanken, qua
abstracta, along the same lines here suggested for ficta. Cf. (1986: 370–3), (1967: 212).
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Holmes is cleverer not only than another fictional character such as Hercule Poirot,
but than any real full-blooded detective.
As to 6), of course there are many discussions between critics about which features
a character really possesses, notably in cases where an author of a story concerning
such a character has not explicitly said anything on that matter. We know that
Gertrude, the unhappy nun of Alessandro Manzoni’s The Betrothed, had intercourse
with the mischievous guy Egidio, but there is debate about whether it was sexual
intercourse. Yet once consensus has been found on the matter, the only kind of
evidence that could dismantle the consensus is the discovery of another more
authoritative version of the relevant story where the author says something explicitly
to the contrary. Nothing like empirical evidence could lead us to revise our ascrip-
tions, as happens with respect to concrete entities. It cannot, for example, turn out
that Holmes is a transsexual, as may happen with concrete humans; the only thing
that can emerge is a more authoritative version of the Holmes stories where Doyle
makes this claim. For the author is the ultimate authority as to whether a fictum
possesses certain features, so that, unlike concrete entities, no revision of feature
ascriptions may take place. Again, Sherlock Holmes is a detective. Why so? Because
Doyle decided to tell the story about him thusly. Had he decided to tell the story
differently, Holmes would have had different features. Could it turn out that Holmes
is not a detective? Certainly not in the sense in which we may discover that a concrete
human e.g. merely pretends to be such. Holmes can turn out not to be a detective
only if we find some more authoritative version of Doyle’s stories in which he is not a
detective.17
As to 7), a character appears to have its properties, the properties by means of
which it is characterized in the relevant story, necessarily. I might have been, say, an
F1 pilot but Holmes could not have been. Of course, Doyle might have written the
Holmes stories differently, stating, for example, that Holmes wasn’t a detective but an
F1 pilot. Yet in such a counterfactual situation, Doyle would have been writing about
an utterly different character (with the same name).
Let us now go back to the metaphysics of fictional characters I previously sketched
in order to see how they cope with the above desiderata. Starting with (Im)possibi-
lism, it turns out that this metaphysics uncontroversially satisfies only the first two
desiderata. Fictional entities do not exist, or better they do not actually exist, for they
(im)possibly exist, i.e., they exist in some (im)possible world. Given that they do not
actually exist, they are causally inefficacious (even though they may well be so in the
worlds in which they exist). Yet (Im)possibilism does not seem to satisfy 3). At least
possible entities are complete, in the sense that for each possible world and property
P, every individual either has property P or fails to have P. While there may be
17 In point of fact, for Syncretism the discovery of another version of a story does not even force one to
revise a property ascription to a certain fictum; it allows us to flank that fictum with another, admittedly
related, fictum having partially different features. More on this later.
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possible worlds in which an entity has P and other such worlds in which that entity
(or one relevantly similar) fails to have P, there are no worlds in which an entity
neither has P nor fails to have P.18 As to 4), for (Im)possibilists, ficta aren’t, qua
(im)possibilia, creations of their authors; at most authors manage to select one such
actually nonexistent entity existing merely (im)possibly.19 As to 5), (Im)possibilists
say that ficta possess the properties by means of which we characterize them in the
relevant stories not actually, but only in some of the worlds in which they exist. As a
result, 7) is also unsatisfied, for again ficta do not actually possess those properties but
they possess them only in some of the worlds in which they exist. As to 6), one may
say that for (Im)possibilists it is satisfied vacuously; insofar as ficta do not actually
exist they do not actually possess the relevant properties, hence there is no space for
ascription revision.
(Im)possibilists may cry, but Artefactualists should not laugh. Like (Im)possibi-
lists, they satisfy both 1) and 2). Qua abstract entities, ficta lack causal powers; thus,
they do not exist in the sense that they do not spatiotemporally exist. Unlike
(Im)possibilists, however, Artefactualists also satisfy 4). For them, ficta are creations
of human mind, insofar as they depend for their own existence on the existence of
some mental activity of their authors. Yet with respect to the remaining desiderata,
Artefactualists are more or less in the same boat as (Im)possibilists. Qua abstract
artefacts, ficta do not actually possess the properties by means of which they are
characterized, they only possess such properties according to the relevant stories, or,
which is the same, in the worlds where such stories are true. A fortiori, it is only
vacuously the case that ascriptions of such properties are not revisable; obviously,
moreover, they do not possess such properties necessarily. Furthermore, ficta are not
incomplete, for again, quite simply, they actually lack all such properties. Yet the
incompleteness desideratum can nonetheless be accommodated by the artefactualist:
a fictum is such that for certain properties P, according to the relevant story it is
neither the case that such a fictum has P nor it is the case that it fails to have P.20
Neo-Meinongians appear to be in a better position than the other metaphysicians
with respect to the above desiderata, for they satisfy 1), 2), 3), 5), 6), and 7). For all
Neo-Meinongians, ficta do not exist, (at least not spatiotemporally). As a result, they
are causally inefficacious. They are also incomplete in a properly objectual sense, in
that for a couple of properties P and its complement non-P, a fictum fails to possess
them because neither property either figures in the relevant set (orthodox Neo-
Meinongians) or characterizes the role viz. the Platonic attribute that fictum consists
in (unorthodox Neo-Meinongians). Yet ficta actually possess the properties by means
18 As Sainsbury (2009: 82–7) has convincingly shown, this raises some doubts as to whether for Lewis
(1978) ficta are really possibilia. For Lewis deals with ficta’s incompleteness by saying that there is some
property P such that according to the relevant story, it is not the case that a certain fictum has P, and it is
not even the case that such a fictum fails to have P. But this implies that there are possible worlds in which
that fictum neither has P nor fails to have P, which lets it hardly be a possible entity.
19 Cf. Priest (2005: 119–20, 142). 20 Cf. e.g. Thomasson (1999: 36–7, 107–8).
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of which they are characterized in the relevant stories, because such properties either
belong to the sets to which they are correlated (orthodox Neo-Meinongians) or
characterize the role viz. the Platonic attribute they consist in (unorthodox Neo-
Meinongians). For these reasons, moreover, they also possess such properties neces-
sarily. Finally, for the same reasons, once it turns out that a fictum possesses one such
property, it turns out that way once and for all; no ascription revision is allowed. Yet,
as has already been stressed, Neo-Meinongians of any kind cannot satisfy the creation
desideratum. Ficta are at most selected by an author among entities in a Platonic realm
of Meinongian objects, existing before the author herself came into existence.
Syncretism, unlike the alternative theories considered so far, accounts for all of the
above desiderata. First of all, since for a Syncretist a fictum does not spatiotemporally
exist, the nonexistence desideratum is accommodated. As a consequence, a fictum
possesses no causal power. Since a fictum is a correlate of a property set, it is
i) objectually incomplete, ii) an actual possessor of the properties by means of
which it is characterized in the relevant story, and iii) a necessary possessor of such
properties, in the very same sense as for an orthodox Neo-Meinongian. Moreover, for
the same reason, no ascription revision of such properties is allowed. Yet unlike all
Neo-Meinongians and like Artefactualists, the creation desideratum is also satisfied.
For a fictum comes into (non-spatiotemporal) existence only once a reflexive stance
concerning the non-committal make-believe process that lies behind its generation
takes place. In this reflexive stance, that process is seen as concerning a certain
property set, which is pretended to be a (typically concrete) individual.
3. Objections and Replies
Its conciliatory character notwithstanding, there are at least three problems that arise
for a Syncretistic metaphysics of fictional entities. First, to conceive of ficta as hybrid
entities made of a certain make-believe process type and of a certain set of properties
sounds rather counterintuitive. Second, insofar as Syncretism is in its turn a hybrid
metaphysics attempting to combine the virtues of Neo-Meinongianism and Artefac-
tualism, it seems nevertheless to inherit some of the drawbacks that stem from those
very virtues, notably, on the one hand, an unnecessary proliferation of fictional
entities and, on the other hand, an inability to explain how ficta can really be created
entities. Let me address these three problems—counterintuitivity; ontological over-
population; indigestible creationism—in turn.
As to counterintuitivity, the Syncretist should bite the bullet. The fact that it is
better for a theory to accommodate intuitive data by no means entails that the theory
itself must be intuitive. Common sense data require no commonsensical theory, but
rather a theory that satisfactorily accommodates our pretheoretic intuitions.21 In this
21 Artefactualists sometimes claim that their metaphysics is commonsensical for it is just a way of
resuming commonsensical uncontroversial intuitions (cf. Thomasson, 2003). But this sounds like a sort of
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respect, one is free to develop a counterintuitive metaphysics provided that it is
explanatorily fruitful. Compare Frege’s metaphysics of natural numbers as classes of
classes. No man in the street would think that, say, three is the class of triples. Yet
insofar as it prompted Frege to allegedly derive arithmetic from logic, such a
metaphysical programme was very fecund. In our case, if conceiving of ficta as the
hybrid entities Syncretism claims they are enables one to accommodate all the
relevant data concerning such entities, this is an indisputable merit of the theory.
What’s the main drawback of Neo-Meinongianism that Syncretism inherits from
its very virtues? Given the rigid identity conditions it posits for fictional entities, it
breaks ontological parsimony. Because, for Syncretism, a fictum is a correlate of a set
of properties, as Orthodox Neo-Meinongianism holds, then if one merely changes,
subtracts or adds one property to the set in question, even a particularly unimportant
one, you get an utterly different fictional entity. For you get a different set. This
sounds rather implausible—if Doyle had written that Holmes lived at 221c rather
than 221b Baker St, or that Holmes also had another flat one floor upstairs, or even if
Doyle had simply forgotten to specify Holmes’s residential address, the resulting
story would be about another character. A fortiori, moreover, no new story about a
particular fictional entity can be produced. For if in her narration an author mobil-
izes further properties over and above those mobilized in a previous narration, a new
fictum comes to the fore. This seems rather implausible as well—we speak of the
success of a certain fictional character insofar as that character engages in new
adventures over and above the original one written by a certain author. This point
may be presented in even more problematic terms. I’ve just said that the main merit
of Syncretism is to accommodate all intuitions about fictional entities. Yet isn’t the
idea that such entities persist through changes across stories another intuition that
Syncretism, unlike other theories,22 is unable to account for?
Once again, the Syncretist should bite the bullet. This time, however, she should do
so by dismantling the conviction that fictional characters persist across different
stories and even across different versions of the same story.23 It may well be the case
that both different stories and different versions of the same story present character
fissions or character fusions. Character fission occurs when one and the same fictional
character in a story (or a version of it) corresponds to different fictional characters in
another story (or another version of the same story). Character fusion is the inverse
phenomenon, when different fictional characters in a story (or in a version of it) are
rhetorical trick. For, as we have seen, Artefactualism accommodates certain commonsensical data while at
the same time rejecting some other commonsensical data.
22 Artefactualism tries to account for the ‘persistence’-intuition by providing at least necessary condi-
tions for cross-fictional identity of a fictional character. Cf. Thomasson (1999: 68).
23 Because for a Syncretist, stories are sets of propositions and so are story-versions, there is no deep
metaphysical distinction between stories and versions. We tend to call a set of propositions a new version
of a story rather than an utterly new story for pragmatic reasons (for instance, because the relevant author
intends not to write another story, but just to refine a previously written one).
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matched by one and the same fictional character in another story (or another version
of the same story).24 These phenomena clearly threaten fictional characters’ identity
across stories (or versions).25 To be sure, this does not mean that the ‘persistence’-
conviction is completely misguided, but that it has to be reinterpreted.
First of all, that conviction can be utterly accounted for in its purportedly intuitive
value not at the level of fictional characters, but at the level of the non-committal
make-believe processes along with their own ‘protagonists’. As I said before, in telling
a tale, an author typically makes believe that there is a certain individual having
certain properties. As is well known,26 this is an utterly antirealist pretence, since
there is nothing at all having such properties. Now, nothing prevents such an author,
or even a different author, from later resuming or better protracting that very non-
committal make-believe process to the effect that the very individual that was
originally pretended to have some properties has further properties. So, the level of
non-committal make-believe, which really involves no individual at all, not even a
fictional character, may well allow for the persistence of an ‘individual’. In a nutshell,
a storyteller first makes believe that there is an individual having certain properties
and later she, or even a different author, makes believe that that very individual has
further properties. This is a case of intentional identity to be grounded not on the
existence of an individual, for there aren’t any, but on the identity conditions of a
make-believe process along with its protraction.27
Now, out of such make-believe protractions—once the proper reflexive stances
take place—different fictional characters will arise; a new character for any such
protraction. So, in writing Orlando Enraged, Ludovico Ariosto protracts a make-
believe game to the effect that there is the same individual named ‘Orlando’ having
certain properties that, in writing Orlando in Love, Matteo Maria Boiardo originally
made believe to have other properties. Such a protracted make-believe process really
involves no individual. Yet out of its original part along with its protraction two
different fictional characters arise: Boiardo’s Orlando and Ariosto’s Orlando.
Clearly enough, as the previous case involving different Orlandos shows, Syncre-
tism commits itself to a plurality of ficta that other metaphysical theories of fictional
entities do not buy into. Yet this overpopulation of ficta is not unconstrained. All the
fictional characters that stem from different versions of the same story, or from
utterly different stories whose underlying make-believe processes are however suit-
ably connected, are linked by a relation weaker than identity, what I have called
24 For concrete cases of character fission and character fusion, see my Voltolini (2012).
25 It is hard to rule out such cases as marginal ones by appealing to something like authors’ intentions to
split or to fuse fictional characters. For such intentions can be obviously overruled. For instance, in writing
a new version of a certain story, an author may simply want to ascribe a certain character a double
personality. Yet readers of that story may not grasp that intention and simply take those two personalities
as amounting to two different fictional characters. In such a case a character fission would have occurred,
the author’s contrary intentions notwithstanding.
26 Cf. e.g. Evans (1982), Walton (1990).
27 Typically, intentional identity occurs in intentional discourse, as Geach (1982) has famously shown.
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transfictional sameness. Fictional characters F and F* are transfictionally the same iff
F*’s make-believe component is a protraction of F’s make-believe component.
Moreover, this move enables a Syncretist to have a fictum that remains constant
across all the relevant stories stemming from the protractions of the original make-
believe process, namely the general character of all such stories. A general character
therefore is a surrogate of what other theorists would like to have as a single fictum
persisting throughout all the relevant stories. For it is what all the particular ficta
linked by transfictional sameness share and to which each of them is respectively
connected by a further relation again weaker than identity, transfictional inclusion.
A fictum F is transfictionally included in a general character G iff both F’s make-
believe component and F’s set-theoretical component are respectively constitutive of
G’s make-believe component and G’s set-theoretical component (G’s set has all the
properties F’s set contains). So, we are entitled to speak not only of the general
Orlando (the Orlando of all so-called mock-heroic compositions), but also of the
general Holmes (the Holmes of all Doyle’s stories plus the Holmes stories of other
authors, such as e.g. Joˆ Soares’ A Samba for Sherlock), the general Faust (the one
encompassing Marlowe’s Faust, Lessing’s Faust, Goethe’s Faust etc.), and so on.
Incidentally, insofar as Syncretism inherits the best of Artefactualism, this is how it
should be. Compare institutions. Granted, the Western Roman Empire, the Caro-
lingian Empire, and the Holy Roman Empire were numerically different institutions.
Yet a family likeness surrounds all of them, which enables one to say that in some
sense they were the same general empire.
Nonetheless, the link between Syncretism and Artefactualism is problematic. For
Syncretism has also to face the main difficulty of explaining how a fictum can really
be a created entity. As many Artefactualists admit, what lurks behind the creation of a
fictional entity is a make-believe process basically consisting of a pretended reference
to an individual.28 Yet it is not clear at all how a fictum can stem from that pretended
reference. Since the make-believe process in question is non-committal, the pre-
tended reference in question is no reference at all: by pretending to refer to some-
thing, one makes believe that there is an individual one is referring to, when in actual
fact there is no such individual. So, as some have pointed out,29 the first act of
pretended reference to something, say by means of the very first sentence of a tale
told by an author, does not suffice in order for a fictum to be created. If in writing the
very first sentence of Pinocchio, namely ‘How it happened that Mastro Cherry,
carpenter, found a piece of wood that wept and laughed like a child’, Collodi pretends
to refer by ‘Mastro Cherry’ to the carpenter that fabricated Pinocchio and took him
as his putative son, no reference to a concrete individual has been so performed; a
fortiori, no reference to a fictional individual occurs. On behalf of Artefactualism, one
may say that the creation of a fictional entity via pretended reference occurs only at
28 Cf. e.g. Schiffer (1996, 2003), Thomasson (2003).
29 Cf. e.g. Brock (2010: 357–9), Yagisawa (2001: 155).
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the end of the relevant make-believe process, let’s say once the author ends telling a
story that her audience has fully understood.30 Yet it remains unclear why ending the
make-believe process should produce the ontological miracle that the very beginning
of that process failed to produce. Nor do other tricks, such as appealing to authors’
creative intentions or the like, seem to fare any better.31
In order to find a way out of this problem, I should be clear at the very outset that,
pace what Artefactualists sometimes say, speaking of ‘creation’ here is just a meta-
phor, at least if ‘to create’ means ‘to bring something into spatiotemporal existence’.
An author does not create a fictum in the very same sense in which a carpenter
creates a table, or a puppet for that matter. In the latter case, a causal process occurs
that brings something into spatiotemporal existence by transforming some piece of
matter—some chunks of wood, say—into another concrete thing. Since Artefactual-
ists agree that ficta are abstract entities, as regards them nothing of that kind can
happen; abstract entities are devoid of causal powers.
A natural conjecture, in light of these observations, is that ‘creation’ of a fictional
entity turns out to be no real creation at all, or at most an altogether different form of
creation, namely, some sort of stipulation.32 In point of fact, as some Artefactualists—
Thomasson above all—emphasize, such generation must be analogous to the ‘cre-
ation’ that brings an institutional entity—say, a nation—into (non-spatiotemporal)
existence. Now, institutional entities have normative force; what brings an institu-
tional entity into existence is the fact that something like Searle’s constitutive rules,
namely, rules that constitute the phenomenon they rule, play a role here. For abiding
by such rules is what prompts institutional states of affairs to subsist.33
Somewhat confusingly, some Artefactualists have appealed to the constitutive role
of such rules for ficta. To be sure, what they literally say is that it is a conceptual truth
that by pretending to refer to something (in a complete make-believe process) there is
a fictional individual one refers to. In other more pompous terms, according to them,
once one grasps the essence of a fictional entity, namely something that is mobilized
30 As Thomasson (1999: 7,140 n. 3) puts it, the creation process may be diffuse.
31 Cf. again Brock (2010). For other arguments against creationism cf. Kroon (2011, 2013). Thomasson
seems to provide an alternative explanation when she posits a creative form of intentionality and holds that
the first thought entertained by an author is creatively directed upon a fictional character (1999: 90). Yet as
I emphasized in Voltolini (2006: 74), if there is anything like creative intentionality, it can only be directed
upon an intentional object, which is not yet a fictional entity by Thomasson’s own lights. For her, it may
only turn out to be so once the appropriate copies of an author’s work are complete. So Thomasson still
owes us an explanation as to how an entity that is originally intended via a certain creative thought may
later turn out to be a fictional character.
32 As Deutsch (1991) first envisaged. Brock (2010: 343) points out that, qua stipulation, Deutschian
creation is no real creation. Since I believe that whenever abstracta are at stake nothing like real creation
can be in play, I utterly agree with him on his conclusion. Yet one should also add that Deutsch’s
stipulation is no real stipulation either, at least if a stipulation has ontological import only insofar as it
has normative force, a performative value. Whereas Deutsch’s stipulation has no such import: in stipulat-
ing that certain fiction-involving sentences are true, an author matches a pre-existent reality already having
the stipulated features.
33 Cf. Searle (1969, 1995).
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by acts of pretended reference, one thereby grasps its existence.34 However, as those
Artefactualists immediately point out, the generation in question here is quite
analogous to the one involving institutional entities, e.g. the one that brings a
marriage into existence by uttering certain words in the appropriate conditions.35
Thus, this analogy makes immediately clear that what prompts all such ontological
generations is not an Anselmian move from essence to existence, but rather the fact
that the relevant conceptual truths express certain constitutive rules. It is conceptu-
ally the case that uttering certain words in the appropriate conditions counts as a
marriage, because such an uttering is the correct way of applying certain constitutive
rules. Analogously, an artefactualist should say that it is conceptually the case that
pretending reference in a make-believe game counts as a fictum, for that fictum
comes into existence by correctly playing that game.
Yet even once one so reframes the artefactualist’s point, the main problem with
this way of putting things is that as far as ficta are concerned, there can be no such
conceptual truth. For pretending to refer to something (in a complete make-believe
process) is not even factually sufficient in order for a fictional entity to be generated.36
As a result, the purported constitutive rule to the effect that by correctly pretending
to refer to something one refers to a fictum is no constitutive rule at all.
In order to see that this is so, compare pretended reference with a very similar
phenomenon, oneiric reference.37 In dreaming, it may well be the case that one refers
to something, typically a concrete individual. Yet this again is a mere imaginary non-
committal reference, insofar as there is no such individual one is really referring to.
The process of imaginary reference in dream does not make it the case that there is an
abstract-like entity, an oneiric entity (let me call it) that one is really referring to.
I may well dream of a dreadful monster that in the dream I name ‘Scary’ even if there
is no individual I am really referring to. The fact that in my dream I have imagina-
tively referred to something does not make it the case that there is an oneiric entity
named ‘Scary’ that I’m now referring to. As such, there can be no conceptual truth to
34 Cf. Schiffer (1996, 2003), Thomasson (2003). 35 Cf. Thomasson (2003: 151).
36 That the inference from pretended reference to ficta is no conceptual truth at all should already be
clear by the fact that, as Everett (2013:132) has also pointed out, pretence antirealists about ficta certainly
share our very notion of a fictional entity and yet they believe that pretended reference has no such
ontological import. As I have said elsewhere (Voltolini, 2006: 100 n. 24), I think that Artefactualists are
here led astray by erroneously assimilating the above inference to the so-called ‘something-from-nothing’
transformations, i.e., necessarily a priori true biconditionals e.g. of the form ‘N is F iff N has the property F’.
(Cf. again Schiffer, 1996, 2003; Thomasson, 2003). Such biconditionals may be legitimately conceived as
conceptual truths committing us to the existence of certain entities, properties in the above case. For in a
biconditional, if its right-hand side is committal, so is its left-hand side.
37 For an early comparison between make-believing and dreaming, see Walton (1990: 43–50). That
comparison is particularly strong from the semantical point of view, for both make-believe and dream
involve context-shift for the relevant expressions (terms that in reality refer to nothing refer to something
in the context of make-believe or in the context of dreaming). The difference between such phenomena is
psychological: unlike standard dreams at least, make-believe involve a meta-representational awareness.
For details on that, cf. Meini and Voltolini (2010).
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the effect that by imaginatively referring to something in a dream, there is an oneiric
entity one is really referring to. A fortiori, no constitutive rule grounding the
generation of such an entity has been thereby expressed. If this is the (negative)
case as regards dreams, why should the analogous case of make-believe be treated any
differently? Granted, make-believe involves meta-representational awareness, in a
nutshell: the knowledge that certain representations are just representations of an
imaginary world. Yet dreams may involve the same kind of awareness, as happens in
lucid dreams (i.e., dreams in which one knows that one is dreaming). Lucid dreams
are as ontologically non-committal as standard, non-lucid dreams. Mutatis mutan-
dis, the same holds of make-believe. It is not in this way that make-believe leads to
commitment to fictional entities.
Here Syncretism comes into play. Artefactualists are quite right to maintain that
the ‘creation’ of a fictional entity is akin to the generation of an institutional entity via
the appropriate constitutive rules. They are nonetheless wrong about where and how
such rules are supposed to act. In actual fact, those rules do not involve the relevant
make-believe process as such, but rather the reflexive stance that allows one to take
that process as involving a certain property set. By seeing a certain make-believe
process as involving a certain property set, a certain fictional entity is eo ipso
generated. Seeing the process in this way amounts to having a fictional entity at
one’s disposal is the relevant conceptual truth expressing a constitutive rule for
ficta. As I have said before, seeing a certain make-believe process as involving a
certain property set allows one not only to focus on the two components a fictum is
made of: a certain property set and a certain make-believe process. But it also allows
us to see that that very process enables the set to be correlated with a certain fictional
individual. Seeing the process in this way is to grasp that fictional individual. Such a
seeing shows itself in uttering an ontologically committing true sentence like ‘F is a
fictional entity’. In other words, even if one is not aware of so seeing a certain make-
believe process, that way of seeing manifests itself in that very uttering. Such a true
uttering is the manifestation of that very reflection. This reflexive stance is thus
utterly different from the meta-representational awareness a make-believe process
involves. As we have seen before, that awareness is ontologically non-committal just
as dreams are non-committal. For it is about the representations that characterize the
relevant make-believe process: it says that a representation of the pretend world is not
a representation of the real world.38 On the contrary, the reflexive stance is a
conceptual pondering on the fact that the make-believe process is a bridge that
connects a certain property set with the fictional individual that is its correlate.
This is the point of the difference that explains why, unlike make-believe, dreams
do not result in any new ontological commitment. Indeed, no such reflexive stance
occurs in the case of dreams, which is why we don’t have oneiric individuals. No way
38 Cf. again Meini-Voltolini (2010).
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of seeing the imaginary process occurring in dreaming as involving a certain set of
properties takes place in such a case. A fortiori, there is no correct way of seeing that
process that leads to the generation of an oneiric individual. As a result of dreaming,
therefore, there is no oneiric individual at our disposal, as is shown by the fact that no
ontologically committing true sentence like ‘O is an oneiric entity’ is ever uttered.
If I were asked for an explanation as to why there is an ontological asymmetry
between the case of dream and the case of fiction, I would be tempted to reply that
dreaming is a private matter involving the dreamer only, whereas fiction is publically
available. Insofar as this is the case, fiction but not dream allows for constitutive rules
to act. For in order for rules to display their normative force, they must be in
principle publicly followed, as Wittgenstein (1953) taught us. In point of fact, it
does not matter at all whether the utterer of an ontologically committing true
sentence like ‘F is a fictional entity’ is either the storyteller lurking behind F’s
generation or someone in her audience. Anyone can see the relevant make-believe
process as involving a certain property set. As a result, anyone can follow the
constitutive rule to the effect that, by so seeing that make-believe process, a certain
fictum comes into being. In a nutshell, ficta are the outcome of correctly seeing the
relevant make-believe process.
To be sure, one might still wonder whether such a reflexive stance really has
ontological import. There definitely are second-order forms of pretence in which one
makes believe that there are fictional entities. Thus, truly saying that F is a fictional
entity cannot be a mark of genuine ontological commitment. I disagree. In a second-
order pretence of that kind, ‘F is a fictional entity’ is not true, it is merely fictionally
true, that is, true in the world of such a pretence. In point of fact, in such cases no real
reflexive stance occurs, only the pretence of one. In such a second-order pretence, one
is merely mimicking what one does by means of a genuine reflexive stance, that is,
stepping outside pretence itself.39, 40
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